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The "Enoch Arden" And Related Problems
The "Enoch Arden" situation, although deriving its name from
a romantic fiction, has become a practical problem in the family life
of our civilization today. The situation arises under the following
circumstances: A man and a woman have married and after maintain-
ing that relationship for a period of time, one of the spouses disappears
and is not heard of for a number of years. The remaining spouse not
only faces social discomfort, but is also involved in serious legal
problems, the foremost being the problem of remarriage. This com-
ment is an attempt to deal with the various legal ramifications of the
"Enoch Arden" situation, with special emphasis on Ohio law.
When an "Enoch Arden" situation arises, the first question is can
the remaining spouse break the bonds of the first marriage and thus
be free to remarry? In those states that allow divorce on the ground
of desertion, the remaining spouse may, after the required period of
time, seek a divorce on this ground. Ohio permits divorce on the
ground of desertion, and the period of time required is one year.'
With the first marriage legally dissolved, the deserted spouse need have
no fear of the "Enoch Arden" returning and disrupting any new
marital status which may have been assumed.
The more serious problems arise when the deserted spouse either
cannot or does not have the first marriage legally dissolved, but never-
theless remarries. In those jurisdictions which do not recognize de-
sertion as a ground for divorce, the deserted spouse cannot legally
dissolve the marriage, unless, of course, other grounds independent of
the desertion exist. Even in those jurisdictions which permit divorce
for desertion, the fear and ignorance of legal proceedings plus the
easily held belief that the absent spouse is dead often lead to a re-
marriage with no attempt to dissolve the ties of the former marriage.
The courts then must decide whether to uphold the remarriage.
At common law, courts uniformly held that a marriage by one
already legally married was void.2 This rule was not altered by the
fact that one spouse to the first marriage had been unexplainedly ab-
sent when the second marriage was consumated.3 This strict rule re-
sulted in great hardship, for after family disruption it is unfair to
restrict the remaining spouse to thoughts of the former marriage, with
no hope of entering into a new marital relationship secure from
attack. Consequently, both the courts and the legislatures have at-
tempted to modify the strict common law rule in its application to the
"Enoch Arden" situation.
I OHO GEN. CODE § 8003-1.
2 Glass v. Glass, 114 Mass. 563, 84 A.L.R. 503 (1874); MADDEN, PERSONS AND
DohrmSnc RE1.ATIONS 39 (1931).
3 Matter of Kutter, 79 Misc. 74, 39 N.Y. Supp. 693 (1913).
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The common law rule 'voiding the second marriage was based
partly on a presumption that the absentee spouse was still alive. To
modify the harsh result in the "Enoch Arden" situation, the courts
began to impose a legal presumption of death after a certain period of
unexplained absence. Most states, including Ohio, adopted a seven
year period.4 Ohio adopted the rule as early as 1857 in the case of
Rice v. Lumley5 and still follows it. Aided by this presumption, the
abandoned spouse may remarry and suffer no legal consequences, pro-
vided the "Enoch Arden" remains absent. The presumption may be
rebutted, however, by a showing that the absentee spouse was alive
when the second marriage occurred. When this is shown, the second
marriage will be declared void ab initio.6 Illustrative of this is the
Ohio case of Fultz v. Fultz7 where the Court said: "This (the presump-
tion) may be true but it is still only a presumption and cannot prevail
against the fact that he is still alive . .. ."
When the absentee spouse returns, the courts are powerless to aid
the abandoned spouse who has remarried. The legislatures in some
jurisdictions have attempted to remedy this situation by statute. Some
states make the second marriage voidable, rather than void, when the
absentee spouse returns.8 Other states make the second marriage valid
if entered into subsequent to a certain period of time after the de-
sertion.9 New York's attempt to cope with the situation is typical.
There the first statute stated: "A marriage is absolutely void if con-
tracted by a person whose husband or wife by a former marriage is
living unless ... such former husband or wife has absented himself or
herself for five successive years then last past without being known to
such person to be living during that time."' 0 This statute was later
changed, and, instead of having the second marriage voidable, it was
declared void unless the remaining spouse had obtained a Court dis-
solution of the first marriage on the ground of unexplained absence
for five years. 1 Under this Statute, if the party remarries after a court
order dissolving the first marriage, the second marriage is valid even
though the absentee spouse later returns; but if no order of dissolution
is obtained, the remarriage is not voidable but void.'2 Ohio has not
attempted to modify the common law rule, and a return of the "Enoch
4 Barsan v. Mulligan, 191 N.Y. 306, 84 N.E. 75 (1908); Davie v. Briggs, 97 U.S.
628, 24 L. Ed. 1086 (1878); Maley v. Pa. R.R. Co., 258 Pa. 73, 101 A. 911 (1917).
5 10 Ohio St. 596.
6 Glass v. Glass, 114 Mass. 563, 84 A.L.R. 503 (1874).
7 9 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 593, 21 Ohio Dec. 159 (1910).
8 CALIF. CIv. CODE § 61; WILLTAAs TENN. CODE 1938 § 8439.
9 LA. REV. Crv. CODE, Art. 80; ARK. STATS. (1947) § 9024.
10 N. Y. DOMESTic RELATIONS LAws §6.
11 L. 1922, CL. 279, March 25, 1922.
12 Anonymous v. Anonymous, 186 Misc. 772, 62 N.Y.S. 2d 130 (1940); See tect
discussion of New York Enoch Arden Statutes, Comment, 6 BROOKLYN L. REv. 423.
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Arden" voids the second marriage.13
In states such as Ohio which have not modified the common law
rule by statute, the use of the presumption of death after seven years
of unexplained absence involves the collateral problem of the burden
of proof. When there is an attempt to rebut the presumption, who
should bear the burden of proving that the absentee spouse was dead
or alive at the time of the second marriage? This problem arose in the
Ohio case of McHenry v. McHenry,' 4 where the defendant in a divorce
action instituted by his wife filed a cross-petition claiming that the
plaintiff had a husband living and therefore the marriage between the
plaintiff and the defendant was a nullity. The plaintiff claimed that the
legal presumption of death after seven years absence placed the burden
on the defendant to show that the plaintiff's first husband was still
alive. Although the Court did not need to answer the contention,
since they found that in fact "seven years had not elapsed at the time
of her marriage to defendant," the Court nevertheless went on to say
that even had the seven year period elapsed, the presumption of death
would not arise in this case for the reason given in a former Ohio
case, 15 that "The rule that an absentee who has not been heard of for
seven years is presumed to be dead is subject to limitations, and cir-
cumstances may be such that no presumption of death will arise.
Where the failure of an absentee to communicate with his friends is
satisfactorily accounted for on some other hypothesis than that of
death, the presumption of death resulting from his absence, unheard
of for seven years, does not arise." The Court went on to say that not
only did no presumption of death arise, but there was a presumption
that the status of the parties to the first marriage continues which must
be rebutted by the party (here the plaintiff wife) claiming the validity
of the second marriage. As authority for this, the Court cited the
Supreme Court case of Industrial Commission of Ohio v. Dell,16 de-
cided the previous year. In the Dell case, one of the parties had entered
into two marriages and the record was silent as to whether or not the
first marriage had ever been dissolved. The Court held that it would
be more reasonable to place on the party claiming the validity of the
second marriage the burden of overcoming the presumption that the
first marriage continues. The Court recognized that when two mar-
riages by the same person are shown to exist, two legal presumptions
conflict; the presumption that a marriage once shown to exist (re-
ferring to the first one) is presumed to continue,"' and the presump-
tion that a marriage once shown to exist (referring to the second one)
13 26 Ohio Jur. 68.
14 19 Ohio App. 187 (1923).
15 Curry, Trustee v. Pierot, 12 Ohio App. 506 (1920).
16 104 Ohio St. 389, 135 N.E 669 (1922).
17 18 R.C.L. 416.
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is presumed to be valid.1 8 By their decision, the Court gave priority
to the first presumption, even while recognizing that this was contrary
to the weight of authority, which, by holding that the second pre-
sumption, prevails, places on the party claiming the invalidity of the
second marriage the burden of overcoming the presumption that the
first marriage had been dissolved.' 9
Although the position of the Supreme Court in the Dell case was
consistent with previous holdings in Ohio,20 and is supposedly still the
law,2 1 later cases have raised some doubt. Five years after the Dell case,
a Court of Appeals expressly adopted the majority view in the case
of Machransky v. Machransky,2 2 stating: "The presumption ... is that
the former marriage has been legally dissolved, and the burden that it
has not rests upon the party seeking to impeach the last marriage."
Ohio Jurisprudence attaches no significance to this case, limiting it to
its facts, that it was a marriage performed in a foreign country after a
questionable divorce from the former spouse.23 Since the Court in the
Machransky case actually quoted from Ruling Case Law which sets
forth the majority position24 and made no attempt to limit the rule to
the facts in the particular case, the view of Ohio Jurisprudence is
hardly tenable. Further significance was added to the Machransky case
in 1946 by another Court of Appeals decision which also distinguished
the Dell case and stated: "It must be conceded also that the great
weight of authority is contrary to this holding (in the Dell case), even
upon the facts that were then before the court." 25 This Court too
repeated the majority rule quoted in the Machransky case. Since there
has been no Supreme Court decision on the point since these two
modifying Court of Appeals cases, it remains to be seen whether or
not the Supreme Court will abandon the minority position of the Dell
case and adopt the majority view.
In general, two solutions for the "Enoch Arden" problem have
been attempted. Some jurisdictions have smoothed the way for the
abandoned spouse by statute, for example New York. In addition, the
majority of jurisdictions invoke the presumption that the second
marriage is valid and that the former marriage has been terminated.26
18 Ibid.
19 18 R.C.L. 428, 26 Ohio Jur. 77.
20 Smith v. Smith, 5 Ohio St. 32 (1855); Evans v. Reynolds, 32 Ohio St. 163
(1877); Heath v. Heath, 25 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 123, 14 A.L.R. 2d 33 (1924).
21 In re Zemmick's Estate, 49 Ohio L. Abs. 353, 76 N. E. 2d 902 (1946); 26
Ohio Jur. 77.
22 31 Ohio App. 482, 166 N. E. 423 (1927).
23 26 Ohio Jur. 78, 79.
24 18 R.C.L. 417.
25 Olijan v. Lubin, 38 Ohio L. Abs. 393, 50 N. E. 2d 264 (1943), afrd without
opinion on this particular point, 143 Ohio St. 417, 55 N. E. 2d 658 (1944).
26 See note 19, stuPaA.
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Ohio has done neither, if the Dell case is still controlling. As a result,
in Ohio, the abandoned spouse cannot safely enter into a new family
relationship without waiting at least seven years. If a marriage
entered into before that period is attacked, no presumptions arise in
favor of it, and the burden of upholding the second marriage falls
upon the abandoned spouse. Furthermore, if the abandoned spouse
patiently waits for seven years and then enters into a new family
pattern, if the "Enoch Arden" returns that new family pattern will be
declared a nullity. Such uncertainty is to be deplored in a State as
progressive as Ohio. Since case law is apt to be slow and awkward, the
matter should be resolved by the legislature.
Another problem involved in the "Enoch Arden" situation is the
possibility of a bigamy prosecution. Because many remarriages have
been entered into in good faith, both parties believing the absentee
spouse to be dead, a criminal prosecution for bigamy seems unjust. For
this reason, bigamy statutes in many states contain a provision to the
effect that the statute shall not apply to a person whose former spouse
has ben absent and unheard of for a stated period of time.27 In Ohio
the period is five years. 28 Because the statutes and case law on this
phase of the "Enoch Arden" situation are much in conformity in the
various jurisdictions, a review of the Ohio law will illustrate the
general pattern.
In Stanglein v. State2 9 the Ohio Supreme Court set forth the
procedural rule that the bigamy indictment need not allege facts show-
ing the five-year exception to be inapplicable to the defendant, but
rather that it is incumbent on the defendant to show that he comes
within the exception by proof that the former spouse had absented
himself or herself for the statutory period, and that the defendant had
no knowledge that the absentee spouse was alive within that time. A
later case stated that once the defendant shows that the deserting
spouse was continually absent during the five-year period, the de-
fendant is not required to show the exercise of due diligence to ascer-
tain the whereabouts of the absentee spouse.3 0 The Court reached this
result by reasoning that although generally, in Ohio, a mistake of fact
to be a defense to a crime must have been made both in good faith and
with the exercise of due care, the Ohio legislature had placed the five-
year exception in the bigamy statute with no mention of due care, and
so had "intended to and did leave the general defense available during
the first five years' separation, but established a milder rule, more
favorable to the accused, available after five years separation." In
pursuing this line of reasoning, the Court was influenced by the case
27 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS (Vol. 1, 1931).
28 OHIo GEN. CoDE § 13022.
29 17 Ohio St. 453 (1867).
30 Hams v. State, 16 Ohio C. C. (N. S.) 433, 31 Ohio C. D. 615 (1906).
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of State v. Stank3 ' where the Court had held that an innocent mistake,
resulting in an honest belief that a former spouse was validly divorced,
is a defense to an accused who has exercised reasonable diligence. Ohio
Jurisprudence voices the opinion32 that the Stank case is not only con-
trary to the weight of authority,33 but is difficult to reconcile with an
earlier Ohio Supreme Court decision3 4 which held that a foreign
divorce decree which is void in Ohio is no defense to a bigamy
prosecution in Ohio. Although on the surface the Stank case seems out
of line with this Supreme Court decision, that decision might be
limited to its facts and so not be applicable where the accused thought
the former spouse dead and not merely divorced. In Harms v. State3 5
the Court held that the five-year exception is not a defense to the
spouse who deserted without just cause.
Ohio's position as to the burden of proof for the five-year ex-
ception is supposed to have been stated in Hanley v. State,36 where a
Circuit Court ruled that the state is not bound to prove that the de-
fendant and his first wife were not divorced, the burden of proving the
disolution of the first marriage being on the defendant. In its dictum,
however, the Court said: "If she (the former spouse) had been absent
or unheard of for any period of time, it is quite likely the burden
would devolve upon the state to show that she was alive-especially if
she had been absent and unheard of for seven years, when a presump-
tion, of course, would arise that she was dead." It is uncertain whether
the Court meant by this that an unexplained absence raises a pre-
sumption of death before seven years, a position not accepted in
Ohio;37 and also whether, after a period of unexplained absence of
the former spouse, the burden of proving the dissolution of the first
marriage would fall on the party claiming the invalidity of the second
marriage, a view followed by the majority of courts but one supposedly
not accepted in Ohio.38 This dictum has never been explained or
distinguished by any subsequent decisions, and could well be made the
basis for arguing that the majority position had been accepted by the
Court.
When a spouse deserted by an "Enoch Arden" remarries and has
children, the problem of their legitimacy arises. Obviously, if the
second marriage is valid, they are legitimate. But when the validity of
31 9 Ohio. Dec. Repr. 3, 10 Bull. 16 (1883).
32 5 Ohio Jur. 620, 621.
33 3 R.G.L. 802.
34 Van Fossen v. State, 37 Ohio St. 317, 41 Am. Rep. 507 (1881).
35 See note 30, supra.
36 5 Ohio C. D. 488, 120 Ohio C. C. 584 (1896), sometimes cited Whalen v.
State.
37 Supreme Commandery, O.K.G.R. v. Everling, 20 Ohio C. C. 689, 11 Ohio C.
D. 419 (1893).
38 See note 21, supra.
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the second marriage is successfully attacked and it is declared void or
bigamous, a serious problem results. At common law, the generally
accepted rule was that children born of a bigamous marriage were
illegitimate.3 9 Fortunately, the Ohio legislature has remedied the
situation. Section 10503-15 of the General Code declares: "The issue
of parents whose mariage is null in law shall nevertheless be legiti-
mate." This positive legislation, plus the well established Ohio doctrine
that the law favors legitimacy,40 protects the issue of any subsequent
marriage by the deserted spouse, even though that remarriage is later
declared a nullity or bigamous.41
In summary, a spouse deserted by an "Enoch Arden" not only
faces social embarrassment, but serious legal problems as well. The
Ohio Legislature has successfully met the problems of bigamy and the
legitimacy of the children, should they not afford further relief to the
abandoned spouse? The case law is inadequate and uncertain, and what
certainty there is gives no protection to this spouse. Other states have
shown that the problem can be met adequately by statute. It is hoped
that the Ohio Legislature will soon see fit to meet this discomforting
social problem in the same manner.
James D. Primm, Jr.
39 Blackburn v. Crawford, 70 U. S. (3 Wall.) 175, 18 L. Ed. 186 (1865); Com-
ment, 7 OHIo ST. L. J. 87.
40 Dirion v. Brewer, 20 Ohio App. 298, 151 N. E. 818 (1925); see cases collect-
ed in 5 West's Ohio Dig. 527, 528.
41 Wright v. Lore, 12 Ohio St. 619 (1861); Gardner, Gdn. v. The B. F. Good-
rich Co., 136 Ohio St. 397, 26 N. E. 2d 203 (1940).
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